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IN TIIE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

, , 11JIJJ;

/'

FOGG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 1900!+

LOllDA F.

FOGG
DP.fendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant Ravmond E. Fogg appeals

a decree of

divorce and distribution of marital assets entered in the
District Court for the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake
Countv, State of Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge Pro
Tel'l.

DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The appellant Raymond E. Fogg, plaintiff bel0w, filed
a co!'lplai.nt for divorce and distribution of marital assets in
<lie District Court of Salt Lake County on December 5, 1981.
(R. ;J).

Trial was hi'!ld in the same Court on May 2, 1982, the

Honnrahle Raymond S Uno, Circuit Judge, sitting as District
Pro TPm.

The appellant was grantPrl a decree of divorce

which neither the appellant nor responciPnt cont0sts.
Court, on the nth dA.y of Jan11arv, l<lR3, signPrl H1P

ThP

dpcr<'('

n[

divorce which was entered on the 10th dav of Januarv, l<lR3.
motion to amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law
filed (R. 101) but abandoned hy the appellant.

A
11/A.c;

Notice of

Appeal was duly filed on the '1th day of Fehruary, 19R3.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant Raymond E. Fogg does not contest the
decree of divorce, which was granted to the appellant in the
instant case, hut appeals onlv fro!'l so m1ch of the decree of
divorce as divided the marital estate of the parties and
reversal of the decrPe and remand for rehearing in the District
Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant was awarded

11.

decree of divorce froEJ the

respondent, the Court finding !'lental cruelty as the justifiahle
groun<ls.

(R. 91).

The appellant an<l respondent were married

on February 14, 1975, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and no
were born as a result of the marriage.

(R. 90, 91).

The

partias hrought into the marriage propertv they ha<l acquirerl
prior to the tine they got married, both parties
!'liddle vears.

(T. lq, 20, 39, 40).

in

The trial court awaY"ded

the appellant a 1CJ77 Ford pickup truck with s'i<->11, a 1°77
trailer, aiuminun bon.t, Rnrl thPr personRl items.

-2-

The

'" ,,1dPnt was awarded a 280Z Datsun automobile, a vacation
: 111 l1nving an equit;1 of $2,800.00 and valued at $5,200.00,
"1·,,

s hnnds and other persona 1 it eras.

(R. q6-98).

The

principal issue in dispute was the equity in a three-bedroom
home located at 1243 \/est 600 South in Salt Lake City, Utah.
The value of the home was appraised at $44,8q0.00, which was
apparently accepted bv the Court and not controverted in the
evidence.

(T. 8)

(Defendant's Exhibit 1).

The mortgage at the

time of trial against the home was $11,243 .OO.

(T. 12).

The

appellant hrousht the home into the marriage and at the time of
the marriage the home had a value of $22, 205. 00.

(T. 11).

Appellant paid between $5,000 and $6,000 for additions to the
horJe from his Navy pension (R. 20) and the respondent paid

$R,OOO towards the home out of funds that she brought into the
!'larriage.

(T. 8, 26).

The respondent purchased a $7,500.00

plus value Datsun autnMobile (T. 13) which she paid for out of
her funds and value from other vehicles.

(T. 39).

The

appellant liad a 1977 Ford true!': which he had paid for with an
old camper, and an old truck.

(T. 44).

The income of the two

parties who work is approximately the same.

(T. 44).

Appellant works as a mail carrier and respondent is also
making the sane as appellant.

The trial court awarded

i11rlgnent in the decree in favor of the respondent in the SUM

1
f

and gave thf> hor:ie to the appelLrnt.

-3-

The com:t

ordered that the appellant satisf:· thP juclgrwnt hv paving th"
sum of $666.116 on Janw1rv 5, lQR3, ctncl PRch And

pvpr•1

montli

thereafter until January 5, 19Ri>, or thP s11m of $7,CJflQ.CJ;>.

(\"

January 5, 1984, the entire balance on the ohligation was to
become due and pay ab le.

(R. 9 7) .

Interest was ordered pay ab le

on the judRment heginning July 5, 19R3, at 12 percent per
annum.

(R. 97).
The hearing on the divorce 1rnd distribution of

property was held on May 21, 1982.

Th<" appellant testified

that after mortgage payment and other expenses he hacl
funds of $158.10 per month over his postal pay.

(T. 22).

Appellant also had a Navy pension of hetween $500 and $600 per
month to which the respondent made no legal claim.

33).

(T. 23,

The American International Vacation Plan which the Court

awarded to the respondent had an equity of $2,ROO.OO hut the
plan sold for and had a value of $5,200.00.

(T. 31-32).

The

value of the home, less the value at the time of the marriaBe,
subtracting the outstanding mortgage, the equity in the home at
the time of the divorce was $11,455 .00.

The judgment of the

Court in favor of the respondent in the sum of $10,543.90 plus
interest is virtually the equity in the home that had heen
developed during the marriage to the respondent,

Tl-i<> orir,inal

minute entry !'lade by the Court after rhf' J-ieqring on "1'1.v 21,

1 'lR2, awarded A.n Pquitv ici th<" ho!'H

0

-4-

to t'1e rPsr>onrlPnt to he

"'tPrmined hy the Court.
1

(R. 17).

On November 23, 1982,

nade a subsequent min11te entrv hased on a motion of

i11r\

, , , pnndf'nt 's counsel and awarded a judgment in favor of the
rPspondf'nt in the sum of $7,Q97.40 at 12 percent interest.
There were letters and coru:iunications ex pa rte

(!'.. f\O).

het11een co11nsel and the court subsequent to the minute entry.

(R. Rl-85).

Counsel for the appellant in one letter to the

Court (R. 81) made the following statement.

"I am concerned about the projections made
bv Mr. Bovee that are bevond the record and trial
that were had
the Court.
I would
hope the Court could find tine for Mr. Boyce and
I to meet
you to review these matters to see
if they can't he resolved."
The minute entry also indicated that the value of the vacation
program was still open for question.

(R. 80).

Thereafter, the

Court entered the decree with the judgment previously mentioned
conteined therein.

No additional opportunity was afforded

cnunsel to have evidence presented to the record or to test the
1

1aluation communicated to the Court subsequent to the hearing

nf Mav 21,

1982.

-5-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT EUTERED flY THE TRIAL COURT IN FAVOR
OF THE RESPONDENT FOR THE Et;UITY IN THE HOME OF
THE PARTIES WAS I!IPROPERLY ENTERED BErAIJSE:
(A)
VALUATIONS ON THE ASSETS OF THE !1ARRIAGE \If.RE
MADE EX PARTE TO THE COURT WHICH AFFECTED THE
COURT'S JUDGMENT AND \/ERE NOT A PART OF THE
RECORD WHICH DENIED APPELLANT DUE PROCESS OF LA\J;
(B) THE JUDGMENT RESULTED rn A DISPARATE AWARD TO
THE RESPONDENT.
A.

Valuations on The Assets of the Marriage \len°
!lacie Ex Parte to the Court Which Affecteci The
Court s Judgment and Were Not a Part of the
Record \1hich Denieci Appellant Due Process of Lav.

The evidence of record showeci that the home in
question vas owned by the appellant prior to the marriage of
the parties and that at the time of the marriage of the partiPs
was valued at $22,205.00.

(T. 11).

The value of the hol!le

the til'le of the trial was $44,890.00.

(T.

8).

At

The outstanr1ing

mortgage against the property was $11, 2 30. 00, leaving an eq11it:.·
in the home attributable to the marriage of the parties of

$11,455.00.

Subsequent to the marriage of the parties the

was put in joint names

(T. 20) and both parties contributed to

the remodeling and improvement of the home.

The respondent

contributed $8,000.00 in cash to the marriage which was
utilized in part on the hor.:Ie.

(T. 8).

The apnr>l lant also

contrihuted in excess of $6,000.00 for additions to the home,
as Hell as paving the mortgage.

-n-

(T.

20).

(0nsecptPntl:1,

tlw

1.,

<

positions of the pnrtif's as to the appreciation of

LivP

, "" ,,q11it:1 <luring the marriage was Rpproximately equal.

If the

cc111it:1 in the home werf' dividf'r1 equally the appellant would
1·eceiue $5,227 .SO as would the respondent.

The trial court

apparently initially believed that the respondent should
rF>ceive out of the equity the amount of cash she contributed to
the marriage and the minute entry enterf'd on November 23, 1982,
set thP. judgment for the respondent at $7 ,997 .40.

(R. 80).

Subsequently, in the decree of divorce the court awarded
respondf'nt judgment against the appellant in the sum of
$10, SLd. 90.

(R. 97).

The monthly payout was set at $666. 66

which would have been appropriatf' for a monthly payout of the
original amount of the judgment entered in the Court's minute
entry.

However, the judgment then called for a "balloon"

payment to become due and payable on the 5th of January, 1984.

(R. 87).
$2,500.00.

The balloon payment would be approximately
This was not contained in the minute entry and

App11.rentlv bears no relationship to what was the evidence of
recor<l in the testimony of the parties or the proffered
exhibits.

In a letter that was sent by respondent's counsel to

'1Dpf'llant's connsel and also to the tri11.l judge and which was
inclu<ler1 in thf' record on appeal (R. 81, 82), it is stated that
1!1p <'quitv in the home after subtracting the pre-marital equity

'"I 1•10rtgage bal!mce was $25 ,441. 79.

-7-

In reality, the Pq11ity is

$11,455.00.

$44,890.00 less mortgage, $11,230, lPss ''aluati,,

at the time of narriage.

Consequently, the Court hrirl heforp "

valuation figures that were not a matter of record anrl hrirl not
been subjected to cross-examination or anaysis during the
trial.

Other information was also contained in the lettPr of

respondent's counsel and it was asserted that respondent would
settle for some $10,000.

This figure appears to he the

approximate figure the trial judge seized on in awarding
respondent judgment.

Counsel for the appellant wrote the court

directly and protested the projections made by rPspondent's
counsel that were

the record and trial matters that

\1ere held he fore the court."

(R. 83).

Counsel also asserte<l

the problems with the payout formula and the impact that
anything different than the Court's minute entry would have nn
appellant.

Appellant's counsel expressly requested that there

be a hearing with the Court to have the matter resolvf'd.

(R. 84).

No such hearing was forthcoming and thf' Court

apparently entered its judgment based on Mattf'rs outside the
record.
It is Hornbook law that the trial court cannot
determine matters not in evidence.
P.2d 1151 (Okla. 1981).

SRe, BarbPr v. Flvnn, 62R

Appellant has never had the

opportunity to cross-examine or challenge the evidencp
submitted ex parte by the respondent in respondent's

-fl.-

''""'nicntion of llovernber 24, 1982.

(R. 80-82).

In State v.

23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P.2d 395 (1970), this Court
consiclererl a proceeding that involved an effort to deprive a
1J<1ther of the guardianship of her children and to deprive her
of parental rights.

In reversing the trial court's action, the

Court helrl that it denied due process of law for the trial
court to consider a social file in making its judgment which
was not a part of the recorrl.

Citing supporting authorities,

23 Utah 2d 414, n. 8, the Court remanded for a new hearing
observing:
In the instant action, the use of the social
file was a denial of due process of law, since
appellant had no opportunity to know,
cross-examine, explain or rehut this secret
evidence.
The holding of the Lance case is applicable to the
circumstances of this case.

There was no stipulation that the

Court could reopen the trial and accept otherwise incompetent
evidence.

Further, the circumstances show that the appellant

was clearly prejudiced by the new communications with the
Court.

l!ost recently, in Girard v. Appleby, __ P.2d

(Utah, No. 17662, March 11, 1983), this Court held in a
different context that a similar process was improper.

The

Court said:
It lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court to grant a motion to reopen for the
p11rpose of t11king additional testimon;1 after the
case has been submitted hut prior to entry of

-0-

judgment. The court shoulrl consider sucl-i a
motion in light of all th0 circumstances and
grant or deny it in the interest of fairness and
substantial justice.
However, no such discretion
is afforded the court to reopen the case
sua sponte. Preservation of the integritv of the
adversarial system of conducting trials precludes
the court from infringing upon counsel's role of
advocacy.
Counsel is entitled to control the
presentation of evidence, and should there be a
failure to present evidence on a claim at issue,
it is generally viewed as a waiver of the claim.
(Footnotes ooitterl).
It is, therefore, submitted that the Court should remand the
matter to the trial court for additional hearing to determine
whether the parties should be allowed to reopen and present
additional evidence, or, in the alternative, whether the
Court's judgment should be changed to reflect the evidence at
trial as expressed in the Court's minute entry of November 23,

1982.

(R. 80).
13.

The Judgment Resulted in a Disparate Award to the
Respondent.

It is respectfully submitte<l that the actions of the
trial court in its decree awarding a judgment to the respondent
in the sum of $10,543.90 and awarding a pavout in excess of

$666.00 per month awarded to the respondent a disproportionate
share of the equity of the home.

As noted ahnve, the actual

equity in the hone that was attributable to the marriage of the
parties was $11,455.00.

The Court a1rnr<led a specific judgrnent

in favor of the respondent of $10,543.QO with 12 percent

-10-

,., tn cor.imence Julv 5, 1983.
,c'I,

,,,.,1

The interest pavment

the July period and the time for the January halloon

'" i:wnt would be approximately $265 .00 and if carried for a
:>er ir•d un ti 1 appellant could oh ta in a loan to make a payout
would completely consume the equity in the home attrihutable of
the f-drties.

(R. 83-84).

Thus, the effect of the Court's

judgrient was the award on the equity in the home to the
respondent.

The other property awarded to the parties

approximately balances out.

There is no apparent justification

for the exceptionallv heavy auard of the P.quity to the
respondent.

Appellant was granted the decree of divorce and

there was no special fault attributable to the appellant.
kespondent is employed earning an income equivalent to the
appellants.

This Court has noted that there is no fixed rule

for determining the allocation of property.

Hamilton v.

Hariilton, 562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1978); Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d
144 (Utah 1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah
lg80).

Rather, the award should be based upon the equities of

the case with a view towards assisting the parties in
reconstructing their lives.

DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah 2d 77,

P.2d 221 (1967); Searle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah
1 Q74);

Reed v. Reed, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979); Hacking v.
620 P.2d 71 (Utah 1980).

In SP.arle v. Searle, supra,

hing upon ncDonald v. McDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066

-11-

(1951), this Court observed that in making an equitahlP
property settlement the following factors were appropriate

fnr

consideration:
(a) the amount and kind of property owned hv the
parties; (b) the property accumulated during
their marriage; (c) the ability of each to earn
money; (<l) the financial conditions and
necessities of the parties; (e) the standard of
living of the parties; (f) the health of the
parties; (g) the duration of the marriage; (h)
what the wife gave up bv way of marriage; and (i)
the age of the parties. 1' 522 P.2d at 698.
Looking to the factors referred to in the McDonald decision,
there are no special equities favoring one party over another.
Therefore, it is submitted that the trial court erred in
awarding the judgment in favor of the respondent which
effectively consumes the equity in the home of the parties and
which substantially favors the respondent over the appellant.
This Court should reverse and require a new hearing, or, in the
alternative, order that judgment be afforded the respondent
only in the sum of $5,727.50, which would he one-half the
equity in the home.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE A\IARDED INTEREST
ON THE JUDGMENT AND SHOULD HAVE ALLO\IED APPELLANT
TO PAY OUT ANY JUDGMENT IN EVEN INC:REtlENTS.

The trial court awarded 12 percent intere>st on the
judgment given the respondent with the interest to commence on
July 5, 1983.

There is no justification of record to sustain

-12-

i"'nnl

of interest which, in effect, further extends the

'''"'"'"! of the equitahle interest in the home of the parties
which was awarded to the respondent.

If appellant failed to

sRtisfy the judgment in accordance with the Court's direction,
then interest might be appropriate but in the absence of any
default on the part of the appellant, the award of interest is
punitive.

See Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 1982),

where the trial court had awarded interest payable to one party
on the equity in a home but on appeal this court held no
interest should be paid.
It is further submitted that by requiring the full
amount of the judgment to become due and payable in January,
1984, thus requiring the appellant to make a balloon payment,
the trial court acted inequitably.

There is absolutely no

evidence of record that the appellant has any assets, liquid or
otherwise, that are expeditiously available to satisfy the
judgment.

The testimony of record showed that the appellant

had only $158.10 out of his salary after making appropriate
µavments and satisfying expenses.

The $666.66 payment as

ordered by the Court would require the appellant to
significantly adjust his life style and to borrow money or take
mnney

from his Navy pension, which was not the subject of any

l'im hy the respondent.
'11urt has

By requiring a balloon payment, the

imposed a punitive obligation far beyond the economic

-13-

wherewithal of the appellant to meet the ohligatinn.

Th 0 r 0

;

no showing of any need for the judgment to be satisfied bv a
lump sum payout.

No testimony was offered at trial to show Rn'

particular need that the respondent had that would require
a special payment.

siic!

The only way that appellant could

effectively meet the balloon payout would be to borrow monev at
a substantial rate of interest which would further jeopardize
the already difficult economic situation of the appellant.
Although the trial court has considerable latitude and
discretion in the disposition of property and the judgment
should not be changed lightly, where a manifest injustice or
inequity indicates a clear abuse of discretion, this Court will
reverse.

Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1977).

This

Court should modify the judgment, if the Court determines the
judgment is otherwise appropriate, to provide for no interest
on the judgment and for a reasonable incremental payout.

It is

submitted that this could better be determined by remanding the
matter to the trial court for further consideration.
POINT III
THE EFFECT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD WAS TO
SIGNIFICANTLY INFRINGE UPotl APPELLANT'S NAVY
PENSION WHICH \JAS IMPROPER AS A HATTER OF LAW AND
WAS BEYOND ANY CLAIM MADE BY THE RESPONDENT.
The appellant, prior to his rnarriagP to thP respondPnr
had completed a lengthy tour of service with the United State•

-1-'I-

,rnr! had

retired.

relativelv
!T

33).

(T. 20).

The appellant's Navy pension

being between $500 an<l $600 per month.

The respondent made no claim to any part of

rlppellant's pension in the pleadings and expressly rejected any
claim to the pension at trial.

(T. 32).

Appellant retired

from the Navy July 3, 1969 (T. 32) and the marriage of the
parties occurred February 14, 1975.

(R. 2).

It was,

therefore, improper for the trial court to enter in its decree
any award to the respondent to any part of the appellant's
pension either directly or indirectly.
In McCarty v. McCartv, 453 U.S. 210 (1981), the United
States Supreme Court held that upon dissolution of a service
member's marriage, federal law precluded the courts from
dividing a service member's retirement pay pursuant to state
divorce laws.

The Court concluded that Congress had

established a comprehensive military personnel program
providing for retirement pay.

The application of state

property laws conflicted with the military retirement scheme
which is designed to reward the retiree for his military
service.

The Court detArmined that conflicts between competing

state and federal policies would impair the objectives of the
federal program as a state decree could intrude upon the
·,ngressional direction.

It is apparently because of the

cRse that respondent's counsel correctly made no claim

-15-

to t!-.2 appellant's pension.

On Fehruarv 8, l'l82, CnngrPs'

modified the effect of the McCartv decision bv enactinR the
Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act, P.L. q7-252,
97th Congress, 10 U.S.C.
the referenced Act.
case.

1408(c)(l), as amen<led hy

1002 of

That Act has no application to the instant

For the Act to be applicable to a military pension, the

spouse must have been married to the service member for ten or
more years, during which time the service member must have
performed ten or more credible years of militarv service.
U.S.C.
Act.

10

1408(d)(2), as amen<led by§ 1002 of the reference<l
The purpose of the Act was to give the spouses of

military personnel, who have shared in the family problems and
military service of the uniformed member, an opportunity to
share in the benefits upon the <lissolution of marriage.

Since

the respondent does not fit within the Act the standards of the
McCartv decision are applicable to the appellant's pension.
This Court's recent decision in Woodward v. Woodward,
656 P.2d 431 (Utah lq82), allowing the trial court to award a
wife a portion of a husband's retirement henefits, is not to
the contrary, since that decision involved a civilian employee
of Hill AFB, whose pension would not he subject to the
protections of the McCartv decision or the Unifnrm Services
Former Spouses Protection Act.

However, to r:he PXtPnt that

trial court would attempt to directly apply Utah law and the
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.,, 1l1l•· apportionment concept of the Woodward decision so as
.i[

lncate to the respondent a portion of appellant's pension,

·er to so structure the decree that the effect was indirectly

the saroe, the trial court exceeded its authority as a matter of
law.

It is respectfully submitted that the action of the trial

court in the instant case did intrude upon the appellant's
pension.

The uncontradicted testimony of the appellant was

that after his expenses and exclusive of lunches he had $158.10
per month to live on.

(T. 22).

The effect of the Court's

judgment in favor of the respondent requiring the appellant to
pay $666.66 per month on the judgment of $10,543.90 and to make
a balloon payment plus interest was essentially to take a
portion of the appellant's retirement pay in violation of the
t1cCartv decision and federal law.

Therefore, the decree should

be modified to allocate the liability to the parties without
reference to appellant's pension.

This Court should remand for

further consideration by the trial court without reference to
the appellant's Navy pension.
CONCLUSION
The facts of this case show that the trial court was
unjustifiably generous in awarding the marital estate of the
r:Ml iPs

to the respondent.

Further, the Court's judgment was

•cised upon matters occurring after hearing, apparently
cnrurnunicated to the Court ex parte and under circumstances that
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violated due process of law.

The decree as actwd l'r PntPred 1,,

the Court further violates the standards of equitable
apportionment of the marital estate of the parties as
previously articulated by decisions from this Court and
intrudes upon the appellant's Navy pension in violation of
federal law.

This Court should reverse and remand for further

consideration with direction that the judgment previously
awarded by the trial court be vacated and the equitable
interest of the parties in the former home of the parties be
divided equally with respondent to receive judgment for her
portion to be paid out on a reasonable incremental basis that
will not unduly burden the appellant or intrude into
appellant's Navy pension.
Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM J. CAYIAS
1558 South 1100 East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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